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1 Introduction 
In this paper we set out to chart the European Union’s (EU) genesis of 
fighting crime as partly one of establishing the EU as an “Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice” (AFSJ) and partly one of facilitating the EU internal 
market creation and the establishment of a global market place. We 
provide an overview of the current complexities facing the EU in its current 
struggles for a reformation and against statist approaches by focusing on 
the law on financial crimes and its contemporary challanges. When viewed 
in an historical perspective the EU’s tactic in the fight against financial 
crimes appears to depart from the classic internal market-based formula of 
the removal of obstacles for market creation and thereby ventures into the 
EU criminal law domain with all of its inherent complexities, without an 
adequately matured legal framework to endorse its policies from within. 
Second, to the extent that the EU adopts the market theory template in the 
EU policy area of ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’, there are global elements 
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to the EU’s sanction policies. These features confirm a hybridity in which 
legal sources are interacting within the AFSJ field. We aim to critically assess 
the current state of play of the regulation of financial crimes in the 
contemporary EU. Furthermore, the paper focuses on recent developments 
in the area of financial crimes by looking at the framework for EU anti-fraud 
legislation: OLAF, the proposed EU Public prosecutor, the function of 
Eurojust and the proposed Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by 
means of criminal law.  Specifically, we discuss the way the Fourth Anti-
Money Laundering Directive came about and if, as claimed by the EU itself, 
it equips the EU with the right legal toolkit for fighting money laundering 
and terror financing. We also set out to scrutinize the constitutional 
implications of an increased powers vested in the EU Agencies in this area 
as powerful players for EU enforcement and we discuss the question of 
accountability as well as the problem of a human rights deficit in this area. 
We end however on a happier note by looking at the judiciaries concern to 
maintain individual data protection and the EU Court of Justice as a 
guarantee of proportionality and reasonableness in European legislative 
action. 
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2. The “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and the fight against 
financial crimes: from OLAF to a European Public Prosecutor 
 
The EU’s fight against financial crimes takes place at multiple levels in the 
EU regulatory machinery:  both within the framework and endeavor of the 
establishment of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and within the 
traditional playing field of the EU internal market and the need to ensure 
market integrity. Furthermore, the EU and the Member States are required 
by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU, Article 325) to counter 
fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the 
EU.  
 
While much has been said about the purpose of fighting financial crimes 
within the internal market1, much less has been said with regard to the 
impact of these findings on the operation of the crime fighting project of 
the AFSJ.2 So while the internal market objectives are well dissected this is 
different in the AFSJ in the context of financial crimes legislation. We argue 
that this is a mistake if one truly wants to understand the EU’s fight against 
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irregularities in the internal market. After all, the AFSJ embodies a 
complicated hybrid system of interacting norms (global, EU and national) 
and should therefore be understood in the light of the classic EU law policy 
of the internal market. In short, the AFSJ deals with, inter alia, security 
issues, border control, anti-terrorism law and crime. While market creation 
has always been focused on principally justifying aims of the Union’s 
increased powers and curtailment of Member State competences,3 the EU’s 
rulemaking powers—when applied outside the traditional context of the 
internal market—ask pressing questions. They ask not just how far national 
sovereignty can be overturned by other concerns, such as the need for the 
construction of the EU market, but also its interaction with the EU’s 
expanding security agenda and the role of fundamental rights protection. 
As a result of the Lisbon Treaty changes, though, financial crimes now form 
a specific part of the competences that are granted to the EU under Article 
83 TFEU, posing the question of whether the EU will go down the AFSJ path 
or if it should stick to its traditional way of resorting to Article 114 TFEU. 
After all, Article 114 TFEU allows for a more expansive use of EU 
competences—as interpreted by the Court of Justice—way of reasoning as 
well as for the adoption of Regulations (which is more restricted under 83 
TFEU which prescribes the use of Directives).  
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Therefore, although financial regulation is an objective of the internal 
market, any financial regulation that involves criminal law responses to 
fight irregularities within the internal market trespasses on the turf of the 
AFSJ. Therefore, what is at stake here is, obviously, also a question of 
competence and a choice of the correct legal basis. The Fourth Money 
Laundering Directive discussed below seems to confirm the view that the 
EU will stick to the market theory model rather than (only) switching to a 
criminal law model within the AFSJ.4 Therefore, we are faced with the 
classic choice-of-legal-basis question where Article 83 TFEU is lex specialis if 
the measure in question is primarily a criminal law measure. Therefore, 
under the present Treaty framework there are good reasons to believe that 
the center of gravity test will point in the direction of more general internal 
market powers. Thus, “mainstream” internal market powers, such as Article 
114 TFEU, are still of crucial importance and are particularly significant with 
respect to the impact in the national arena as this provision also allows for 
the adoption of regulations—thereby having a direct impact on citizens. 
From a Member State perspective, there is merit with respect to engaging 
Article 83(2) TFEU as compared to action taken under Article 114 TFEU, in 
that this provision grants the possibility for the Member States to pull an 
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emergency brake if a proposed measure appears to be too sensitive for the 
national criminal law system. Moreover, the use of Article 114 or Article 
325 TFEU (anti-fraud rules) would mean that the United Kingdom (UK), 
Ireland, and Denmark would not be granted the “cherry-pick” possibility of 
opt-outs as they otherwise would regarding legislation within the AFSJ (in 
accordance with Protocol 21 and Protocol 22).5  
 
Yet the importance of fighting financial irregularities against the EU is 
however far from a new endeavor when, most importantly, one considers 
the powers of the European Anti-Fraud Office, OLAF.  It concentrates on 
frauds committed against the EU, and it doesn’t impose any anti-fraud 
obligations on member states.6  The origins of its strategy can be traced to 
the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy which resulted in the 
number of allegations of fraud increasing.7 However, it was not until the 
1970s that the EU began to realize the threat to its finances posed by 
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fraud.8 Therefore, it is needed to briefly set out the EU path towards the 
current ‘tough on financial crimes’ approach. 
 
An important part of the EU’s fraud policy is of course the European Court 
of Auditors, which acts as an independent reviewer of the EU’s finances and 
which has played an important role in the history of EU anti-fraud 
measures.9  It determines whether any fraud has been committed against 
the EU and identifies whether or not the fiscal procedures have been 
recorded, properly implemented in lawful method to guarantee efficiency 
and effectiveness.10  The Court of Auditors has highlighted instances of 
fraud on several occasions to the European Parliament,11 however, their 
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efforts have been hampered because they are not entitled or allowed to 
undertake any anti-fraud investigations.12  The European Parliaments 
Committee of Budgetary Control who recommended that a ‘flying squad’ 
should be created to investigate allegations of fraud raised this problem.13  
As a result, ‘Unite Co-ordination de la lute anti-fraude’, (UCLAF) was 
established in 1987 and became operational in 1988, with the objective of 
dealing with fraud against the EU.14 UCLAF was created as a result of an 
increase in financial irregularities within the EU and the resulting criticism.15  
Its effectiveness was limited due to its small number of “desk bound” staff 
16 and its disorganised structure.17 Both of which inhibited its ability to 
effectively investigate fraud.18  UCLAF’s position became precarious 
following the reported loss of £600m of humanitarian aid to fraudulent 
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18
  B Tupman, . (2000), ‘The sovereignty of fraud and the fraud of sovereignty: OLAF and 
the wise men’, Journal of Financial Crime, 8(1), 32–46, at 43. 
  
 
 
9 
activities.19 The Court of Auditors recommended the establishment of an 
autonomous anti-fraud agency and 20 OLAF, was born in 1999.21  OLAF’s 
objective was to assist EU institutions to combat fraud and other financial 
indiscretions.22  OLAF is responsible for the “fraud-proofing of EU 
legislation”,23 and it has the ability to conduct administrative 
investigations,24 which are defined as inspections and other appropriate 
measures performed by OLAF staff to determine the quality of the 
allegation under investigation.  There are two types of investigations – 
internal and external.  Internal investigations relate to the fina ncial in 
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discrepancies of EU and alleged staff misconduct,25 while external 
investigations relate to activities that occur outside the EU. The 
effectiveness of these investigations is limited due to OLAF’s inability to 
independently initiate them,26 although it is permitted (though seemingly 
not encouraged) to assist other Member States by sharing information and 
financial intelligence.27   
 
OLAF’s performance has been limited due to the “shadow of UCLAF” 28  and 
its relationship with Eurojust, the EUs Judicial Co-operation Unit.  Eurojust 
was created to fight organised crime by improving the level of co-operation 
during investigations and prosecutions that occur in more than one 
Member State.29 The relationship has been described as “rather 
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troubling”,30 a position that worsened after Eurojust asserted that it saw 
OLAF as a competitor rather than a colleague.31  Furthermore, OLAF has no 
enforcement powers and only makes recommendations.32 
 
The question of enforcement of EU anti fraud policies is then largely left to 
the EU Court of Justice through it case law.    According to the well 
established case law starting with the Greek Maize33 case, Member States 
have to protect EU interest the same way as it protects national interests. 
Specifically, this case concerned fraud against the EU where the Court held 
that : “… the Member States must ensure that infringements of EU law are 
penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are 
analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar 
nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.”   
 
This long-standing case law on the equivalent protection and effectiveness 
of the system as developed by the EU Court of Justice has been 
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32
 Vlogaret, Johan and Pesta, Michal (2008), 
‘OLAF fi ghting fraud and beyond’ in S. Brown (ed.), Combating international crime – the 
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complemented by a number of legislative instruments to fight fraud against 
the EU budget. The first relevant anti-fraud measures in this area were 
adopted in 1995 with the Convention for the protection of the financial 
interests of the European Communities (the PIF Convention).34 
 
On that background, and a lot more recently in May 2015, the European 
Commission adopted a Proposal for a Directive on the fight against fraud to 
the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law’.35 The proposal is 
based on Article 325 TFEU and the fight against fraud against the EU’s budget 
and at first instance this appears to be a significant development in the 
evolution of the EU’s counter fraud strategy. The scope of the proposed 
Directive is limited to fraud committed against the financial interests of the 
EU. The Commission states that the framework is complemented by general 
Union criminal law measures for the fight against certain illegal activities 
particularly harmful to the licit economy, such as money laundering and 
corruption although not specific to the protection of the Union's financial 
interests - also contribute to their protection.36  
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It could be argued though that this division between the Union’s financial 
interests and the Member States interest does not make much sense when 
viewed in the light of the EU’s market regulation powers. Of course, Article 
325 TFEU only empowers the EU to fight fraud against its own budget. As 
will be shown below though with regard to the broader picture of market 
regulation and the construction of an AFSJ, the EU has largely transgressed 
the division of competence with regard to EU and Member States finances 
and fiscal powers. Therefore, it is suggested that the limitation set in Article 
325 TFEU entails a rather cosmetic rule since the overall approach adopted 
by the EU seems not to be limited to fight fraud against the EU but also sets 
out to regulate the Member States as a result of the financial crisis. 
 
3.1. The proposed establishment of a European Public Prosecutor 
How would the situation then develop with the adoption of the European 
public prosecutor (EPP)? Indeed, should a EPP be established (Article 86 
TFEU), such a prosecutor would have far-reaching investigative powers in 
the area of financial crimes.37 The prosecutor will be responsible for 
investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, where appropriate in 
liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of and accomplices in offences 
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against the Union’s financial interests, as determined by the regulation 
provided for in Article 86 TFEU. The establishment of an EPP has however 
met some serious opposition.38 However considering the fact that at 
present 11 Member States have voted against the proposal through the 
yellow card procedure, it appears as if the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism will be the only venue available. The Commission has 
maintained essentially intact its proposal notwithstanding only the second 
use of the yellow-card subsidiarity procedure since the procedure’s 
inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty.39 The main argument as presented by the 
Commission is that Eurojust and Europol have a general mandate to 
facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate national criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, but lack the power to carry out acts of 
investigation or prosecution themselves. According to the Commission, 
action by national judicial authorities remains often slow, prosecution rates 
on the average low and results obtained in the different Member States 
over the Union as a whole unequal. Based on this track record the judicial 
action undertaken by Member States against fraud may currently not be 
considered as effective, equivalent and deterrent as required under the 
Treaty. There is a fundamental flaw in the creation of a European Public 
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Prosecutor. It is difficult to separate on the one hand rules relating to 
investigations and prosecutions, at the EU level, and on the other hand, 
trials at Member State level. According to Peers, the Commission should 
have considered other possibilities of more limited measures to achieve the 
same objectives such as the harmonisation of the national prosecutions 
rules in this area.40  
 
Indeed, Article 86(4) provides the opportunity for a future European 
Council to adopt a decision amending the competences of such a 
prosecutor to include serious crime with a cross-border dimension in the 
broader sense. The UK is interesting in this regard also. Should the UK stay 
in the EU, the UK European Union Act 2011 would require a referendum 
before it could agree to the UK accepting an EPP into UK law, although 
there are no indications the UK government wishes to opt-in to the 
proposed EPP.41  
 
However, the establishment of an EPP has encountered some serious 
opposition with 11 Member States voting against its adoption through the 
yellow card procedure, it appears as if the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism will be the only avenue available. The Commission’s proposal 
has essentially remained intact, notwithstanding the fact that the yellow-
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card subsidiarity procedure has been used twice since the procedure’s 
inclusion in the Lisbon Treaty.42 The main argument as presented by the 
Commission, is that Eurojust and Europol have a general mandate to 
facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate national criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, but they lack the power to carry out acts of 
investigation or prosecution themselves.  
Whether Eurojust would simply be transformed into an EPP or would 
be used to assist the formation of an EPP is an open question on the basis 
of the phrasing in Article 86(1). As noted by Conway, it is an open question 
whether it would be useful to continue Eurojust as a separate prosecution 
branch.43 If an EPP is adopted by only some, at least nine for the enhanced 
cooperation to be triggered Member States, Eurojust would automatically 
remain for the non-participating Member States.44 This confirms that the 
result would remain messy and unclear to what extent the result would be 
‘effective’ from enforcement perspective or ‘transparent’. 
 
A classic example of the EU’s market powers to regulate financial crimes is 
that of the anti-money laundering area. Despite the Lisbon Treaty changes 
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and the increased legislative powers in criminal law as mentioned above 
the latest Money Laundering Directive is based on Article 114 TFEU. 
 
4. EU Anti-Money Laundering Action: The Fourth Directive 
The fight against dirty money has always been a high priority in the EU. 
Money laundering is by definition based on another crime termed a 
predicate offence, which gives rise to the laundering in question. In this 
respect, it should, however, be observed that there is an on-going debate 
in legal doctrine about the need to have a general definition of predicate 
offences in order to meet the legality requirement of strict construction 
in criminal law. It has been suggested that a problem with the 1991 and 
2001 Money Laundering Directives was that they did not provide a 
definite list of predicate offences or the definition of a serious crime as 
the threshold for criminal activity. Itwas later superseded by another 
Directive in 2005 which introduced the risk  based approach and also the 
fight against the financing of terrorism.45 
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The European Parliament endorsed and agreed the Fourth Money 
Laundering Directive in May 2015.46  Member States are expected to 
implement the Directive’s provisions by June 2017.  The introduction of 
the new Directive seeks to improve the levels of AML and counter-
terrorist financing regulations in the EU.  Another factor that influenced 
the introduction of the publication of the Directive was the publication of 
a new set of Recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
in February 2012.47  The Fourth Directive seeks to “implement the  
recommendations issued by the FATF revised in February 2012, which set 
a global standard for combatting money laundering and terrorist 
financing“.48  Kaetzler and Kordys took the view that “the European 
legislator … exceeded some recommendations of the FATF and has 
included some additional European requirements. The stricter regime, 
extensive risk analysis and more requirements will involve more 
organisation and more work for obliged entities”.49  
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The Fourth Money Laundering Directive addresses a number of important 
issues that include the variation of the risk-based approach, the 
development of new rules that apply to electronic money, registers for 
ultimate beneficial ownership, no distinction between internal and external 
politically exposed persons, improved levels of cooperation between 
financial intelligence units and an improved sanctions regime.50  
Additionally, Cogman noted that “key changes relate to firms' compliance 
obligations rather than to the substantive money laundering offences … 
proposed amendments to know your client …  Controversial proposals for a 
public register of the beneficial owners of companies”.51 
 
Within such a risk-based approach to money laundering, private 
actors, such as lawyers and banks, are expected to make risk assessments 
of their customers and divide them into low and high-risk.31 The rationale 
for actively engaging the private sector in the AML process is to make them 
collect the appropriate information.32 Therefore, this is commonly referred 
to as a ‘risk-based approach’ because private actors are required to pass on 
sensitive information based on a risk assessment of their clients. But the 
risk-based approach could also be seen in a broader governing context of 
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risk regulation at the EU (criminal law) level. Thus, the question of the 
governing of risk connects to the justification of EU legislative action in the 
first place.52 
 
It must be pointed out that although the modifications to the risk based 
approach are welcome, they merely add to an already existing important 
part of the global AML.  For example, the use of a risk-based policy has 
gained significant momentum since the FATF amended its 
Recommendations in 2003.53 The risk-based approach promotes a closer 
working relation between the FATF and the private sector.  In July 2007 the 
FATF published its guidance on a risk-based approach which stated that: 
“By adopting a risk-based approach, competent authorities and financial 
institutions are able to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate money 
laundering and terrorist financing are commensurate to the risks identified. 
This will allow resources to be allocated in the most efficient ways. The 
principle is that resources should be directed in accordance with priorities 
so that the greatest risks receive the highest attention”.54 
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Furthermore, the FATF has issues several guidance notes for the private 
sector that seeks to incorporate the risk-based approach.55    The use of a 
risk-based approach of the FATF is now contained in Recommendation 10 
(formerly Recommendation 5).56 
 
In addition to the adoption of the risk-based approach by the FATF, the EU 
has also embraced this “key concept”.57  However, it is important to note 
that the EU was initially skeptical of adopting such an approach.58  The Third 
Money Laundering Directive follows a very similar stance to that contained 
in Recommendation. 5 For example, Article 6 states “but may determine the 
extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis depending on the type of 
customer, business relationship, product or transaction”.  The Directive also 
provides that customer due diligence comprises: “identifying, where 
applicable, the beneficial owner and taking risk-based and adequate 
measures to verify his identity so that the institution or person covered by 
this Directive is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, 
including, as regards legal persons, trusts and similar legal arrangements, 
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taking risk-based and adequate measures to understand the ownership and 
control structure of the customer”. Therefore, the risk-based approach is 
“entrenched into EU law”.59  The risk-based approach has also been 
adopted by the Basel Committee,60 International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors 61 and the International Organisation of Securities Commission, 
which shows that the EU is merely following the international trend here.62  
 
As explained, the Fourth Money Laundering Directive seeks to establish an 
increased focus on risk assessment at the national level. Such a risk 
assessment is to be carried out in liaison with various agencies that should 
provide guidance for the Member States as to how to carry out risk 
assessments and where European Supervisory Authority plays a key role by 
also being asked to provide regulatory technical standards where needed 
for financial institutions to adapt their internal controls to deal with specific 
situations. Europol is the main player in the EU anti-terrorism tracking 
system. According to the Europol Decision,63 the agency is given a number 
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of principal tasks including: (1) the collection, storage, analysis, and 
exchange of information and intelligence, and (2) the exchange of 
information concerning Member States about criminal offences.64 
Moreover, as is stated in Article 88 TFEU, “Europol’s mission shall be to 
support and strengthen action by the Member States’ police authorities.” It 
is then meant to act as a complementing authority, but it is becoming a 
primary actor. This is interesting (as well as problematic) from a democratic 
and accountability perspective. More specifically, Europol has been given 
substantial powers to shape procedural rules and conclude international 
agreements. It should be remembered that the Meroni Doctrine holds that 
only executive powers can be delegated from the EU institutions to 
agencies and their use must be entirely subject to the supervision of the 
delegating institution.”65 Moreover, in the recent European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) case, 66 Regulation No 236/2012 lay down a 
                                                                                                                
 
(2009/371/JHA) 
64
 C Matera, The Influence of International Organisations on the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: A First Inquiry, in S Blockmans & R Wessel (eds)., Between autonomy 
and dependence: the EU legal order under the influence of international organisations 269 
Springer 2013. 
65
 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche s.p.a. v. High Authority 
[1957-1958] ECR 133, M Simoncini, Legal Boundaries of European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) in the Financial Markets Tensions in the Development of True Regulatory Agencies 
(2015) YEL 1-32, see also P Schammo, ‘EU day-to-day supervision or intervention-based 
supervision: Which way forward for the European system of financial 
supervision?’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 771, 789 
 
66
 C-270/12, UK v Council and European Parliament, nyr. 
  
 
 
24 
common regulatory framework with regard to the requirements and 
powers relating to short selling and credit default swaps to ensure greater 
coordination and consistency between Member States. The UK challenged 
this on the basis of that it not intended to authorise ESMA to take individual 
measures directed at natural or legal persons. The Court of Justice upheld 
the Regulation. It stated that “the EU legislature, in its choice of method of 
harmonisation and, taking account of the discretion it enjoys with regard to 
the measures provided for under Article 114 TFEU, may delegate to a Union 
body, office or agency powers for the implementation of the harmonisation 
sought. That is the case in particular where the measures to be adopted are 
dependent on specific professional and technical expertise and the ability of 
such a body to respond swiftly and appropriately.”67 
 
The outsourcing of responsibility in the fight against financial crimes has 
several dimensions. For example, Europol plays an increasing role as a 
global information hub and information center.  The agency collects 
proceeds, retains and exchange data on unprecedented way.68  Most 
importantly, Europol was involved in the EU-US Agreement on the Terrorist 
Financing Tracking Programme.69 Accordingly, Europol assesses whether 
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the data requested in any given case are necessary for the fight against 
terrorism and it’s financing. In addition, the interpretation of the data 
allows Europol to pinpoint the areas, activities or populations, which are at 
risk and should be given priority in the fight against organized crime at the 
EU level.70 Yet the new powers granted to Agencies, as noted, raise familiar 
questions not only about the accountability of these actors but also about 
the desirability of outsourced enforcement powers from the perspective of 
judicial review.71  
 
Yet, the importance of agencies in EU lawmaking in general is far from new. 
Agencies are often said to represent a step in the direction of “better 
regulation.”72 It appears to be unclear what exactly is the place of these 
agencies in the legislative context and their place in the AFSJ machinery. 
After all, areas such as medical authorization, electricity regulation, and 
heath regulation are spaces that have all been reformed in recent years and 
have offered examples of hybrid governance in terms of combining 
traditional EU legal instruments with network models relying on agencies 
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and new forms of governance such as comitology and open method 
coordination.73 This is all new in the AFSJ. While this paper will not delve 
into this complex debate, it is clear that the technocratic approaches pose 
difficulties from the democratic perspective as many issues such as medical 
regulation touch upon ethical issues that require democratic legitimation 
and accountability. Nevertheless, the prospect of adopting a technocratic 
model to the AFSJ, with regard to criminal law, should raise concern. 
 
While the AFSJ agencies of Europol and Eurojust do not have direct 
regulatory enforcement powers, they are increasingly important players in 
the regulatory machinery within the AFSJ. As Monar points out, the 
Member States have kept the law enforcement powers and have not 
delegated such powers to the AFSJ Agencies, with the exception of Frontex 
in the area of migration law policies.74 Yet Europol has been given extended 
powers to supervise the EU crime-fighting agenda within the AFSJ. This has 
resulted in a complex relationship between AFSJ legislation and the role 
played by Europol in, for example, the financial tracking program and those 
legislative acts such as the Fourth Money Laundering Directive, discussed 
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above, that are part of the internal market acquis. As for those instruments 
adopted within the internal market, the European Securities and Market 
Authority (ESMA) is responsible for any supervision. The ESMA contains a 
review clause that grants the Court of Justice the power to review the fines 
imposed by this agency. But it is not clear to what extent Europol and 
Eurojust can be held to account for their actions.75 The same holds true for 
the possible establishment of a European Public Prosecutor, which will have 
far-reaching powers to investigate EU financial crimes.76  
 
As explained, the Fourth Money Laundering Directive seeks to establish an 
increased focus on risk assessment at the national level. Such a risk 
assessment is to be carried out in liaison with various agencies that should 
provide guidance for the Member States as to how to carry out risk 
assessments and where European Supervisory Authority plays a key role by 
also being asked to provide regulatory technical standards where needed 
for financial institutions to adapt their internal controls to deal with specific 
situations. Europol is the main player in the EU anti-terrorism tracking 
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system. As noted, according to Article 88 TFEU, “Europol’s mission shall be 
to support and strengthen action by the Member States’ police 
authorities.” It is then meant to act as a complementing authority, but it is 
becoming a primary actor. The present paper can do no more than point 
out the complex interrelationship between the need to decentralize and 
make the Commission more effective, and basic concerns about the rule of 
law and legitimacy as well as accountability in criminal law. 
 
6. EU Financial Regulation and white collar crime: the UK experience 
As noted above, market regulation in the area of financial crimes and 
consumer confidence were not a focus of the EU’s initial responses to the 
financial crisis nor were they reflected on the international agenda.77 The 
UK is an interesting test case with regard to the EU’s financial crimes 
agenda. For example, many commentators have stressed the ‘gold plating’ 
phenomenon, or over-implementation, in connection with the AML 
regime in the UK.78 For example, it has been pointed out that the notion 
of ‘suspicion’ in relation to the source of the proceeds of crime appears to 
have constituted a crucial theme in UK AML legislation. Thus, rather than 
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stipulating the requirement of ‘knowledge’that is, ‘intent’the UK 
legislator seems to rely on ‘suspicion’, which constitutes a lower threshold 
for prosecution on the criminal law scale. This is interesting, as the 
Directives in question refer to the requirement of ‘knowledge’ rather than 
an objective test consisting of ‘having reasonable grounds to suspect’.  
This position can be contrasted with that adopted in the UK where 
successive financial regulatory agencies have been given the specific 
mandate to tackle and reduce financial crime.  This was a very significant 
development in the UK and perhaps it could be simply classified as a 
‘common sense’ approach given the historical links between the financial 
services sector and financial crime.  The unique approach adopted in the UK 
resulted from the realistion that its financial services sector is continuously 
threatened by financial crime.  This resulted in the partial merger of several 
important pieces of financial crime legislation with its financial services 
regulation.  For example, by virtue of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA 2000), the then Financial Services Authority (FSA) was given a 
statutory objective to reduce financial crime.79  The UK statutory definition 
of financial crime was as including ‘any offence involving fraud, or 
dishonesty, misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a financial 
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market or handling the proceeds of crime’.80 The principal objective of the 
FSA has therefore been to focus on the anti-money laundering (AML) 
systems and controls that the regulated sector has in place.81 Under the 
FSMA 2000, the FSA makde rules in relation to the prevention and 
detection of money laundering.82 The rule-making powers of the FSA were 
originally contained in the Money Laundering Sourcebook,83 but these were 
detailed, burdensome and very similar to those in the Money Laundering 
Regulations 1993.84 The Money Laundering Sourcebook has been replaced 
by a principles-based approach in the Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls (SYSC) part of the FSA’s Handbook.85 The amended 
version provides that firms must have in place systems and controls which 
are appropriate for the firm to conduct its business.86 This includes: a 
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requirement to carry out regular assessments of the adequacy of AML 
systems so as to protect themselves from being used to further financial 
crime;87 the allocation of a director or senior manager with overall 
responsibility for establishing and maintaining an AML system; and, the 
appointment of a cer (MLRO).88 The SYSC regime seeks to provide the 
regulated sector Money Laundering Reporting Offiith an even higher degree 
of flexibility, which allows them to identify the risks and determine how 
they can best allocate their resources in areas which are most vulnerable. 
This approach seeks to encourage and enable the regulated sector to target 
their resources most appropriately on activities at risk from money 
laundering, thus reducing AML compliance costs 
 
The most important tools that the FSA has in the fight against money 
laundering are its extensive investigative and enforcement powers.89 The 
FSA has the ability to require information from firms,90 to appoint 
investigators,91 to obtain the assistance of overseas financial regulators92 
                                            
 
87
 Financial Services Authority, FSA Handbook (Financial Services Authority 2006, SYSC 3.2.6 
C). 
88
 Financial Services Authority, FSA Handbook (Financial Services Authority 2006, SYSC 3.2.6 
H and I). 
89
 J. Bagge, ‘The Future for Enforcement Under the New Financial Services Authority’ 
(1998) Company Lawyer, 19(7) 194–197, 195. 
90
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss 165–166. 
91
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, ss 167–168. 
92
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 169. 
  
 
 
32 
and provide appointed investigators with additional powers.93 Furthermore, 
the FSA has become a prosecuting authority in respect of certain money 
laundering offences.94 These powers apply whether or not the entity to be 
prosecuted is actually regulated by the FSA.95 The FSA also has the power to 
impose a financial penalty where it establishes that there has been a 
contravention by an authorized person of any requirement imposed under 
FSMA 2000.96 For example, the FSA has fined firms and MLROs who have 
breached its AML rules even where there was no evidence of money being 
laundered.97   This seems highly problematic from the perspective of fair 
trial and the presumption of innocence.  
 
However, it is important to note that by virtue of the Financial Services Act 
2012, the FSA was replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority and the 
financial crime statutory objective was removed and it is now associated 
with the FCAs consumer protection and market integrity objectives.98  The 
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FCA stated that “one of our objectives is to ensure the integrity of the 
markets … a key part of that is ensuring that our markets operate honestly 
and that the firms we regulate understand, and manage, the financial crime 
risks that they face”.99  Hill stated that “the FCA must also have regard to 
taking action in relation to financial crime. This will be a freestanding duty 
to take action in relation to any fraud, dishonesty, misconduct and handling 
the proceeds of crime”.100  The regulator will continue to concentrate its 
resources towards maintaining “standards of conduct in the financial 
services industry”.101 This means that the FCA will adopt a very similar 
approach towards the reduction of financial crime as that adopted by the 
FSA, namely that regulated firms must have appropriate systems and 
controls.  Another legacy left by the FSA are the “the tools … impose 
penalties for … money laundering”.102  Furthermore, the FCA will be 
expected to follow and further develop the FSA’s credible deterrence 
strategy.103  This would involve the FCA continuing to “taking tough, 
targeted, effective and public action against misconduct perpetrated by 
firms and individuals”.104   The influence of the EU is clearly illustrated by 
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the UK’s continued adoption of the EU’s money laundering and Directives.  
However, it is interesting to note that the limited influence of the EU on the 
enforcement strategy of the city regulator and it therefore appears that the 
UK is becoming the ‘yard stick’ on the enforcement of its financial crime 
objectives that the EU and other Member States could consider adopting. 
 
7. Fundamental rights? Challenges ahead beyond Europe 
While the discussion on the increased involvement of Agencies as monitors 
of financial crimes, pose well known questions about accountability they 
also pose more general questions of fundamental rights protection in the 
EU. Specifically, the discussion on the EU’s regulatory endeavors to fight 
fraud and money laundering, pose some intriguing questions with regard to 
the adequate protection of personal data and applicable human rights 
protection. Indeed, there are some difficulties ahead for the EU and the 
Member States when it comes to ensuring a uniform standard of human 
rights protection. Although Article 52 sets of the Charter sets out the 
possibility to derogate from Charter rights when complied with 
proportionality, the applicable human rights standard needs to be 
sufficiently high. Specifically, Article 52(1) of the Charter sets out some 
important exceptions to the application of the Charter as a whole. This 
provision makes it clear that: 
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Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized 
by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence 
of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of 
proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary 
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Yet there is reason to believe that the principle of proportionality as a 
guarantee of fundamental rights could have a significant impact in the 
area of the EU’s suppression of financial crimes. A recent ground-breaking 
decision where the principle of proportionality was applied to strike down 
a legal measure on the retention of data is the Digital Rights case. The 
Directive 2006/24105 authorized the gathering of data and far reaching 
surveillance mechanisms in order to ensure the effective fight against 
crime. The Court annulled the 2006 Data Retention Directive, which was 
aimed at fighting crime and terrorism and which allowed data to be stored 
for up to two years. It concluded that the measure breached 
proportionality on the grounds that the Directive had a too sweeping 
generality and therefore violated, inter alia, the basic right of data 
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protection as set out in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. If 
the Court is to develop criteria for the increasing use of proportionality as 
a balancing principle in connection with the Charter, this will arguably 
confirm a more robust view of fundamental rights protection in AFSJ 
context. 
 
As a follow up to the Digital Rights106 judgment, in Schrems,107 the Court 
asserted that the fact that US law allows US intelligence services to access 
the personal data of EU citizens without sufficient privacy safeguards 
breaches EU law. The Commission ‘Adequacy Decision’ 2000/520, adopted 
pursuant to Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46. Under 
Directive 95/46 allowed for the transfer of personal data to the US subject 
to the assessment of the Commission. Yet the Court held that when data 
is transferred to a third country this is only permissible where the third 
country in fact ensures an ‘adequate level of protection’. The Court 
annulled the Directive on the ground that it provided for a far-reaching 
competence of US authorities to monitor data in breach of the Charter 
right of data protection and private life.  These findings of limits sets to 
sweeping generality and domination in the EU law making are arguably 
readily translated to the EU financial crimes area. While the Court may be 
prepared to pass security focused legislation, if taking the digital rights 
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case seriously it requires a justification on behalf of the legislator requiring 
a specificity in the legislative approach.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has critically assessed the EU and UK’s current tactics in the fight 
against financial crimes by focusing on the EU’s contemporary framework 
for fighting fraud and money laundering in particular. The objective of this 
paper was to chart the EU;s financial crimes agenda when discussing the 
fight against financial crimes in EU law and what external “bouncing” 
effects it may have. Additionally, this paper placed the EU’s regulatory 
efforts in this area by locating it in the context of the current tide of global 
EU action. The study of EU financial crime poses difficulties as it 
demonstrates a very complex relationship between various actors and 
various legal bases and offers an example of non-market values read into 
Article 114 TFEU. While financial regulation and the fight against financial 
crime is still at the heart of the EU’s “getting tough on crime” approach, the 
old internal market endeavors in this area are now much more complex 
than they used to be.108 In particular the extended powers granted to EU 
Agencies asks difficult question about democratic oversight in the AFSJ. 
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The EU’s approach towards money laundering can be contrasted with that 
towards the prevention of fraud.  For example, the EU continues to 
introduce and require Member States to implement its money laundering 
Directive.  The fourth Directive will be implemented by June 2017.  This 
approach clearly places the onus on Member States to adhere to the 
international standards of the FATF and related UN money laundering 
conventions.  However, the EU’s position towards the prevention of fraud is 
contrary to the plethora of related legislative provisions aimed at tackling 
money laundering.  For instance, there is no EU fraud Directive to impose 
basic obligations on Member States, the proposed Directive only applies to 
fraud committed on the finances of the EU.  Furthermore, it appears that 
the EU is more concerned with fraud that is related it its own finances as 
opposed to fraud committed against its member states.  The effectiveness 
of the EU’s counter fraud measures is also restricted by the limited remit of 
OLAF, who are unable to commence an investigation or even instigate any 
criminal proceedings.  It is still unclear whether there will be any 
establishment of an EPP, but the reluctance by the Member States 
demonstrates the sensitive nature of these questions and also highlights 
the difficulty of enforcement. While striping the EPP of its power but still 
granting some investigative authority, the only thing achieved is a half 
baled solution to a pressing problem of how to coordinate the EU’s function 
as an active player in the game against financial crimes.  The EU it to 
seriously consider tackling the increasing threat posed by fraud it is strongly 
  
 
 
39 
recommended that it looks no further than its impressive AML policy in 
terms of an effective financial crime model. This comes with a price though. 
Concepts such as risk regulation and securitization seem to take us far from 
constitutional safeguards and concern for the individual. All this shows that 
risk regulation has become the new normal in AFSJ law, imported from the 
internal market but with a different kind of consequences.  
